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While the United States Supreme Court held in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin that the University’s admissions plan was constitutional and 
that race-conscious admissions policies are still permissible, the movement 
to eliminate the consideration of race in college and university admissions is 
still going strong in current litigation against the University of North Carolina 
– Chapel Hill and Harvard University. Many argue that we are living in a 
“post-racial” society and no longer need race-conscious admissions; how-
ever, this Article argues through colorblind discourse that there has been a 
sustained and continual effort to eliminate the consideration of race. This Ar-
ticle provides an understanding of colorblind discourse, the legal background 
on race-conscious admissions, it applies colorblind discourse while examin-
ing current litigation, and it proposes best-practices for recruiting and retain-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 9, 2015, during the 2015 – 2016 term, the United States 
Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) heard for a second time, Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I and Fisher II).  The main question 
centered on whether the University of Texas at Austin’s (“UTA”) implemen-
tation of its admissions plan in conjunction with Texas’s Top Ten Percent 
Plan met the two-prong strict scrutiny standard of being a compelling state 
interest and narrowly tailored means to meet the stated objective.1  In its 2013 
Fisher I ruling, the Supreme Court found the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
(“Fifth Circuit”) failed to properly apply the strict scrutiny analysis to the 
 
1.  Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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contested plan.2  In 2011 and 2014, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Univer-
sity’s admissions format is constitutionally sound based on the strict scrutiny 
standard.3  Because the application of the doctrinal framework for strict scru-
tiny is at issue between the high court and the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Fisher II is of great interest, along with the various con-
tests against race-conscious admissions.  
This Article uses colorblind discourse to analyze post-racialism argu-
ments in today’s legal contests against race-conscious admissions in current 
litigation against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina – 
Chapel Hill and efforts at the state level to ban affirmative action.  This Ar-
ticle will first define the concept of post-racialism and present arguments that 
opponents of race-conscious admissions believe racism is no longer embed-
ded in our education systems.  This Article then examines colorblind dis-
course and its intersection with education.  Some legal scholars have argued 
that the Supreme Court has adopted a colorblind constitutionalism,4 which is 
“a collection of legal themes functioning as a racial ideology”5 that operates 
as “treating race as if it were, like eye color, a wholly irrelevant characteris-
tic.”6  Colorblindness is maintained and perpetuated by the denial of race as 
a social and cultural definer.7  If race is reduced to one’s imagination or a far-
fetched rationale for claims of inequity, candid discussions about race are 
ignored or relegated to “nonsense.”  Intentionally and inadvertently, the 
colorblind legal rhetoric has and continues to be used to enfranchise while 
simultaneously disenfranchising people of color.8    
Second, this Article will provide a background of race-conscious admis-
sions cases, such as Bakke,9 Grutter,10 Gratz,11 and Fisher I,12 before using 
the understanding of colorblind discourse to posit why the Supreme Court 
 
2. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).  
3. Fisher v. Univ.  Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822 (5th Cir. January 18, 2011; 5th Cir. July 15, 
2014), available at: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-50822-CV2.pdf. 
4. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991); 
see also Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever, 65 VAND. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012); see also David A. 
Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, SUP. CT. REV. 99, 134 (1986); see also Laurence H. Tribe, In 
What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Colorblind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 207 
(1986). 
5. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 2.  
6. Strauss, supra note 4, at 114. 
7. Id. 
8. David G. Holmes, Affirmative Reaction: Kennedy, Nixon, King and the Evolution of Color-
Blind Rhetoric, 26 RHETORIC REV. 24, 26 (2007). 
9. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
10. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
12. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411.   
           
554 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:551 
accepted Fisher I for a second time, especially in light of justiciability ques-
tions regarding the “troublesome threshold issues relating to standing and 
mootness.”13  In this portion, the Article will also analyze the Supreme 
Court’s Fisher II oral arguments and ruling.  Third, current litigation and ef-
forts to ban race-conscious admissions, such as Students for Fair Admissions 
v. Harvard University14 and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of 
North Carolina-Chapel Hill,15 are discussed.  And finally, this Article dis-
cusses implications and best practices for institutions to continue recruiting, 
admitting, and enrolling students of color.  Given that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Fisher II continues to uphold race-conscious admissions and there 
are two other lawsuits in litigation, this Article revisits the Supreme Court’s 
race-conscious admission decisions as a precursor to examining challenges 
involving race-conscious admissions again if the matter reaches the Supreme 
Court with a President Trump appointed justice.  
II. POST-RACIALISM 
Following the first election of President Barack Obama, individuals with 
various political ideologies touted that America was now a “post-racial” so-
ciety.16  This mythical assertion permeated not only everyday discourse, but 
it also became a useful legal tool in race-conscious admissions debates.  Spe-
cifically in a legal context, “[r]ace-based affirmative action, race-based ad-
missions or redistricting in school-desegregation plans . . . all come under 
scrutiny in a post racial-world.”17  
Given the vacancy on the Supreme Court as a result of Justice Scalia’s 
sudden death in 2016, his successor, President Trump’s nominated Neil Gor-
such, most likely will be an advocate of post-racial measures, which will 
cloak the continued advancement of White supremacy.  “In short, post-ra-
cialism insulates white normativity from criticism and opens the floodgates 
of white resentment when confronted with previously accepted and unques-
tioned civil rights inequities.”18  A post-racial society rebuts history and con-
text in lieu of the belief that equal opportunity is afforded to all Americans 
without any discriminatory barriers.  Coupled with colorblind discourse, 
post-racial society rhetoric impedes persuasive legal arguments. 
 
13. Spann, supra note 4, at 204. 
14. Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard Univ., No. 1:14-cv-14176 (D. Mass. filed Nov. 
17, 2014). 
15. Students for Fair Admissions v. Univ. of  N.C.-Chapel Hill, No. 1:14-CV-00954-LCB-
JLW (M.D.N.C. filed Nov. 17, 2014).  
16. Michael C. Dawson & Lawrence D. Bobo, One Year Later and the Myth of a Post-Racial 
Society, DU BOIS REV. 6:2, 247, 247-49 (2009). 
17. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1649 (2009). 
18. Cho, supra note 17, at 1596. 
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III. COLORBLIND DISCOURSE 
Colorblind discourse centers “on managing the appearance of formal 
equality without worrying overmuch about the consequences of real-world 
inequality.  Proponents of a colorblind ethos define freedom and equality ex-
clusively in terms of the autonomous—some would say atomized—individ-
ual.”19  This “atomized-individual” is without a history and void of political 
affiliations or social interactions.20  This person exists in an abstract world 
with equal opportunity and preferences, rather than a racist, sexist, homopho-
bic and socially stratified structure.21  Ultimately, the atomized person is a 
fictitious creation of non-Whites that masks White supremacy and frustrates 
the realities of people of color as they seek higher education admission.22  
Colorblind discourse is used to examine these cases from a critical perspec-
tive to understand the judicial approach in race-conscious admissions.   
This colorblind universe that has embedded itself into our society is sub-
stantiated by social and legal systems.  First, race and skin tone are viewed 
as synonymous.23  The reduction of race to pigmentation allows people to 
argue that categorizing by perceived phenotype is discriminatory.24  How-
ever, the historical, but silenced, racial stratification saturated with privileges 
for Whites, is absent.25  Second, acknowledging race as a scientifically 
flawed project by depraved-hearted White men versus a powerful and domi-
nating societal construction, frames race as taboo to recognize and those who 
do are “implicitly manifesting racial enmity or racial preference.”26  Third, 
presenting racism as a “personal problem” and offending behavior only being 
exhibited by Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) members, erroneously leaves out liberal 
card-carrying Whites.27  This erroneous disconnection of racism from subtle 
everyday acts masks power and subordination.   
Absent from the Supreme Court Justices’ questions regarding allegations 
of reverse discrimination by White plaintiffs is the acknowledgement and 
validation of the systematic, cyclical, and long-standing underrepresentation 
of students of color in university settings due to racism, specifically at selec-
tive institutions, such as Michigan, Texas, North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and 
 
19. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Ideology of Colorblindness, in RETHINKING THE 
COLOR LINE: READINGS IN RACE AND ETHNICITY 101, 105 (Charles A. Gallagher ed., 5th ed., 
2014). 
20. See id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Guinier & Torres, supra note 19, at 101. 
24. See id.  
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 102. 
27. Id. 
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Harvard.  Studies show students of color are more likely to attend resource-
poor schools, tracked away from academic programs that lead to college, and 
placed in vocational programs.28  If the K-12 pipeline is stalled and filled 
with more obstacles for students of color to succeed than their White peers, 
the Supreme Court should find merit with arguments that present data evi-
dencing how inequities prohibit all students from accessing higher education 
on the same level.  That White applicants have been historically privileged 
with access to higher education is a key consideration missing within the Su-
preme Court’s current race-conscious admissions jurisprudence.29  
Neil Gotanda asserts the idea of a “formal race” analysis used by the 
Supreme Court in which it views individuals “as neutral, apolitical descrip-
tions, reflecting merely ‘skin color’ or country of ancestral origin.”30  Formal-
race is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.”31  Therefore, 
in reverse discrimination lawsuits involving White plaintiffs, courts dismiss 
the “connections between the race of the individual and the real social con-
ditions underlying a litigation or other constitutional dispute.”32  Without the 
acknowledgement of historical or social factors, the interests of Whites are 
made supreme in intentionally not recognizing race.33  Ultimately, colorblind 
legal rhetoric “allows the Supreme Court to be blind to the law’s role in sus-
taining white supremacy and to preserve the myth of the law’s innocence.”34  
As a legal strategy, colorblindness is appealing to the judiciary, but for 
litigants suing for justice, “it has now become an impediment in the struggle 
to end racial inequality.”35  Using a formal race approach to decisions gives 
justices a non-complicated task.36  If the veiled realities of racism are not 
acknowledged, the judiciary’s decision making process can be performed in 
a manner in which abstraction prevails and intellectually sound rulings are 
 
28. Patricia Gándara, Addressing Educational Inequities for Latino Students: The Politics of 
“Forgetting,” 4 J. HISPANIC HIGHER EDUC. 295 (2005); see also THE FIRST-YEAR EXPERIENCE 
MONOGRAPH SERIES, TRANSFORMING THE FIRST-YEAR OF COLLEGE FOR STUDENTS OF COLOR 
(Laura I. Rendón et al. eds., 2004). 
29.  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 676 (1938); see also Sipuel v. Board of Re-
gents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for 
Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
30. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 4. Western State College of Law Professor, Neil Gotanda, has 
litigated, taught, and published deeply on discrimination and civil rights; he is one of the nation’s 
foremost scholars on critical race theory. Full Time Faculty, WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW 
https://www.wsulaw.edu/faculty-and-staff/full-time-faculty#neil-gotanda (last visited July 13, 
2017).  
31. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 4. 
32. Id. at 7. 
33. Id. 
34. Carrie Crenshaw, Colorblind Rhetoric, 63 S. COMM. J. 244, 254 (1988). 
35. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness. 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062 
(1991). 
36. Id. 
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issued based on the Supreme Court’s creation of doctrinal tests that cannot 
be invalidated unless the Court acquiesces.37  
Colorblindness in legal jurisprudence was first introduced by Justice 
Harlan in his Plessy dissent, where he stated, “[o]ur constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”38  Consider-
ing the preceding text to this infamous statement that has been adopted by so 
many, provides a complete and accurate understanding of Justice Harlan’s 
viewpoint: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, 
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of 
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class 
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind. . 
.39  
Highly critical of the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Plessy and 
Brown, an Associate Professor of English and Humanities, David Holmes, 
asserts there was “rhetorical maneuvering around color consciousness and 
back toward a racist consciousness in vogue during those historical moments.  
This is why the defenders of both decisions could claim to be following the 
letter of the Fourteenth Amendment.”40  The use of legal rhetoric around 
equality masks the systemic issues of “how we engage or ignore race as an 
ideology so as to reproduce said material inequalities,”41 which results in the 
maintenance of the status quo and in reality, continued inequality. 
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS: SETTING THE LEGAL 
BACKGROUND 
Opponents of race-conscious admissions programs have argued that the 
programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because they consider race in admitting students.42  Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution, “no State shall . . . deny to any 
 
37. Id. 
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
39. Id. (emphasis added). 
40. Holmes, supra note 8, at 36. 
41. Id. 
42. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013).  
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”43 and “similar 
individuals . . . be dealt with in a similar manner by the government.”44  To 
determine the constitutionality of a government act, courts must apply one of 
three standards of judicial review—strict scrutiny, mid-level scrutiny, or ra-
tional basis.45   
Because race is at question in these race-conscious admissions cases, 
courts must employ the strict scrutiny standard when deciding whether the 
admissions policy is constitutional.46  Strict scrutiny is the most stringent 
standard of review used by the courts, and the most demanding of the reviews 
to satisfy.47  Strict scrutiny is also required in government acts concerning 
discrimination based on national origin, religion, and alienage.48  To pass 
strict scrutiny, the government must first illustrate that its act to treat people 
differently is justified by a compelling government interest.49  As the law 
currently stands, the Supreme Court has found that the promotion of diversity 
in higher education is a “compelling governmental interest.”50  Second, under 
the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court must find that race-conscious 
admissions policies are “narrowly tailored.”51  To be constitutional, a gov-
ernment act employing racial classifications must satisfy both prongs.52  
Cases have established the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutionally 
aligned programs over the past several decades.  Next, these cases are briefly 
discussed.   
A. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was the first Supreme 
Court case that set the foundation for race-conscious admissions.53  The Uni-
versity of California Davis Medical School considered race in its admissions 
practices by strictly setting aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for “eco-
nomically and educationally disadvantaged applicants and members of a mi-
nority group (Blacks, Chicanos, Asian Americans and American Indians).”54  
 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
44. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, 208 (3d ed. 1999). 
45. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
500-92 (17th ed. 2010). 
46. Id. at 519. 
47. Id. at 500. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 501.   
50. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.  
51. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
52. Id. 
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.  
54. Id. at 289. 
           
2017] A COLORBLIND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 559 
A White male applicant who was rejected twice by the medical school 
claimed that he was denied admission because of his race in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.55   Allan Bakke argued the medical school accepted 
less qualified racial minority applicants because the minority students who 
filled these sixteen spots had lower GPAs and test scores than otherwise re-
jected White students.56  While the Supreme Court found the medical 
school’s race-conscious policy unconstitutional because reserving a specific 
number of seats to be filled only by minorities was not narrowly tailored,57 
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling that race could never be 
considered a factor in admissions programs.58  In this opinion, Justice Powell 
noted that diversity is critical to train future leaders.59  It is a compelling gov-
ernment interest to have a broader definition of diversity where race and eth-
nicity are important factors along with other qualifications and characteris-
tics.60  Additionally, an admissions program may consider diversity 
holistically while examining an admissions application.61  After Bakke, some 
universities were still uncertain how race could be used in admissions.62  
B. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER & GRATZ V. BOLLINGER 
After a couple of decades and many lower court decisions, in 2013, the 
Supreme Court provided clarity about the appropriate use of race in Grutter 
v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.63  The six-to-three Gratz decision struck 
down the undergraduate admissions program at the University of Michigan, 
because it held the automatic designation of twenty points to every applicant 
from an underrepresented minority group was not narrowly tailored nor a 
 
55. Id. at 278. 
56. See id.  
57. Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go from 
Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 23 (2004); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277. 
58. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-20. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 313-20. 
61. Id. at 318. 
62. See generally Podberesky v. Kirwan 38 F.3d 147, 158 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
University of Maryland’s scholarship program for African-American students was not narrowly 
tailored); see also Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding the University’s race-
conscious admissions policy unconstitutional); see also Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 
1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the University’s race-conscious admissions policy); see also 
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237(11th Cir. 2001) (finding the Uni-
versity’s race-conscious admissions policy unconstitutional). 
63. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003). 
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holistic approach.64  Quota systems insulate certain applicants from compe-
tition with other applicants based on race or ethnicity.65  However, in Grutter, 
the law school’s admissions program satisfied Bakke, because it considered 
each applicant as an individual, looking at how each may contribute to the 
diversity of the school and using race and ethnicity only as a “plus” in addi-
tion to other characteristics.66  In a five-to-four decision, the Grutter Court 
adopted Justice Powell’s ruling in Bakke, finding that race could be consid-
ered in admissions practices, so long as it was one of the many factors con-
sidered.67  The Supreme Court upheld the reasoning that student body diver-
sity is a compelling state interest.68  
The Grutter Court also required admissions programs to consider other 
criteria beyond grades and test scores, such as the applicant’s personal state-
ment, the quality of the undergraduate institution, letters of recommendation, 
and whether the applicant chose challenging undergraduate courses, among 
other criteria set by the institution.69  This holistic review could also examine 
one’s study abroad experiences, language proficiencies, and record of com-
munity service.  The Supreme Court found narrow tailoring does not require 
that “exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative” be attempted 
before a race-conscious policy is implemented, but it does require that uni-
versities consider race-neutral plans in good faith.70  Up until now, this ap-
proach to admissions has survived the strict scrutiny test while under review 
of the Supreme Court.71  However, recent cases, such as the grant of certiorari 
of Fisher II72 and the filing of cases against Harvard University and the Uni-
versity of North Carolina - Chapel Hill by the Students for Fair Admissions, 
Inc.,73 suggest that universities may no longer be able to admit students with 
this approach.  This potential change will be discussed later in the Article.  
While the Grutter Court mentioned “the deviation from the norm of equal 
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter[,]”74 Justice 
 
64. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 250-60.  
65. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.  
66. Id. at 328. 
67. Id. at 312. 
68. Id. at 320-25. 
69. Id. at 312.  
70. Id.  
71. See Eckes, supra note 57, at 28. 
72. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014), available at: 
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-50822-CV2.pdf. 
73. Students for Fair Admissions v. The President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., et al., No. 
1:14-cv-14176-DJC, 2014 WL 6241935, (D.Mass. Nov. 17, 2014); see also Students for Fair Ad-
missions v. U. of N.C., et al., No. 1:14-cv-00954, 2014 WL 6386755 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014). 
74. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-47. 
           
2017] A COLORBLIND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 561 
O’Connor suggested “the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary”75 in twenty-five years from its ruling in 2003.76  Given that only over 
one decade later since the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of 
race-conscious higher education admission programs and evidence of insti-
tutional racism is still embedded in American society,77 it is premature for 
today’s Supreme Court Justices to reverse its previously held precedence.    
C. FISHER V. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (“FISHER I”) 
In 2008, Abigail Fisher claimed racial discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause because she was denied admission to UTA.78  Based 
on current legal precedent, UTA considered race as a factor among many 
others, and it currently admits students through a two-step process based on 
state and federal law.79   
First, under the state’s Top Ten Percent Plan, high school students who 
graduate in the top ten percent of their class are eligible for automatic admis-
sion to any public college or university in Texas.80  The Top Ten Percent Plan 
was passed in response to the decline in minority student enrollment after the 
decision in Hopwood v. Texas.81  The law also suggested that public univer-
sities consider a variety of other factors in admissions decisions for students 
not eligible under the law, which included socioeconomic status, bilingual 
proficiency, and first-generation college student.82  Not surprisingly, race 
was not one of these factors.83  Although students are automatically eligible, 
it does not necessarily mean that they are automatically admitted to their in-
stitution of choice.84  
Second, based on the Grutter v. Bollinger decision, applicants that are 
not eligible under the state’s Top Ten Percent Plan could be considered using 
the Grutter standard, which considered race as one of many “plus factors” 
that each candidate contributes to the learning environment.85  UTA asked 
students to identify their race among five predefined racial categories, and 
race was not assigned a numerical value, but was considered a meaningful 
 
75. Id. 
76. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 344-347.  
77. David H. K. Nguyen, et al, Strict Scrutiny & Fisher: The Court’s Decision & Its Implica-
tions, 299 EDUC. L. REP. 355, 371-372 (2014). 
78. Fisher v. U. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
79. Id. 
80. See generally, Texas Top Ten Percent Law, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009). 
81. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932. 
82. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.805 (West 2009). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2413. 
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factor.86  The various plus factors were then plotted on a grid and students 
above a specific baseline were offered admission, while others were not of-
fered such admission.87  Fisher claimed that she was discriminated against 
because UTA used the Grutter-based race-conscious admissions process af-
ter admitting students through the Texas-legislated Top Ten Percent Plan.88  
The District Court found UTA’s policy constitutional.89  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled the policy was not akin to an illegal quota or racial balancing 
and affirmed the District Court’s finding.90  The Fifth Circuit interpreted 
Grutter to give substantial deference to UTA to define the benefits of diver-
sity that provide the compelling government interest and to determine 
whether its admission plan is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.91  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held seven-to-one that the 
Fifth Circuit failed to properly apply strict scrutiny.92  The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit.93  While the Fisher 
I Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Grutter-based admissions pro-
grams that considered “racial minority status as a positive or favorable factor 
in a university’s admissions process, with the goal of achieving the educa-
tional benefits of a more diverse student body,”94 it stressed, as outlined in 
Gratz and Grutter, that these admissions processes must undergo the strictest 
standard of judicial review.95  Justice Kennedy, in Fisher I, agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit that UTA has the expertise and experience to determine the 
scope of diversity and how it would benefit its campus, students, faculty, and 
staff.96  However, Justice Kennedy did not agree on the level of deference 
that the lower court gave to UTA regarding how it implemented this admis-
sions plan.97  Justice Kennedy wrote, “there must still be a further judicial 
determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its imple-
mentation.”98  The University must prove that its chosen means to attain di-
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strict scrutiny that the University is to receive no deference.100  Complying 
with this rationale would have required the lower court to test whether there 
was no other alternative to achieve the benefits of diversity than this admis-
sions plan. 
However, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was “ill-equipped” to make this 
determination and that it only needed to ensure UTA made a good faith effort 
to consider alternatives.101  Justice Kennedy disagreed stating that the Fifth 
Circuit deferred the narrow tailoring analysis to UTA’s good faith without 
considering evidence sufficiently.102  While the Supreme Court, in Fisher I, 
did not overrule the use of race-conscious admissions policies upheld in the 
previous Grutter decision, dissenting Justices Scalia and Thomas supported 
the notion for doing so.103  In sharp contrast, Justice Ginsburg, argued that 
under strict scrutiny UTA’s policy does not require further judicial review, 
and its use of race as a factor continues to serve an important purpose in 
helping UTA to increase the educational benefits of diversity.104  Addition-
ally, she argued that colorblind, race-neutral policies, such as Texas’ Top Ten 
Percent Plan, which are supposed to be less discriminatory alternatives to 
race-conscious plans are actually by no means race-neutral.105  
On remand, the Fifth Circuit heard the case again.106  The Fifth Circuit 
gave the attorneys a list of questions to consider at this next level.107  The list 
of questions addressed everything from whether the case is now moot be-
cause Fisher graduated from another institution, Louisiana State University, 
to whether the appeals court or district court should hear the next round.108 
The Fifth Circuit had the option of ruling on the constitutionality of the plan 
or sending the case down to the district court to determine additional facts 
involving the plan.  Attorneys for Fisher urged the Fifth Circuit to rule on the 
case, while the University requested the case be sent back to the district court 
in order to gather additional facts about the admissions policy.109  The Fifth 
Circuit found merit with Fisher’s position by stating “there are no new issues 
of fact that need to be resolved, nor is there any identified need for additional 
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discovery; that the record is sufficiently developed . . . remand would likely 
result in duplication of effort.”110  
Some scholars suggest the Supreme Court wanted the Fifth Circuit to 
make it more challenging for colleges and universities to implement race-
conscious admissions plans.111  However, the Fifth Circuit in a two-to-one 
decision found merit again with UTA’s plan being constitutionally sound in 
both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis by being narrowly tailored to 
achieve diversity.112  The Fifth Circuit began its discussion by restating the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in Grutter that “all racial classifications imposed 
by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny.’”113  The court acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s Fisher dissent 
“faulted the district court’s and this Court’s review of UT Austin’s  means to 
achieve the permissible goal of diversity – whether UT Austin’s efforts were 
narrowly tailored to achieve the end of a diverse student body.”114   
Before proceeding with its analysis, the Fifth Circuit declared “our 
charge is to give exacting scrutiny to these efforts.”115  After a detailed dis-
cussion of the Top Ten Percent Plan and the University’s additional admis-
sions office diversity efforts, the court reiterated the Grutter precedent, which 
mandates that “narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every con-
ceiveable race-neutral alternative” but rather “serious, good faith considera-
tion of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the 
university seeks.”116  The court asserted “put simply, this record shows that 
UT Austin implemented every race-neutral effort that its detractors now in-
sist must be exhausted prior to adopting a race-conscious admissions pro-
gram-in addition to an automatic admissions plan not required under Grutter 
that admits over 80% of the student body with no facial use of race at all.”117  
The Fifth Circuit then brought attention to the circumstances under 
which the plan exists by stating that “the sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent 
Plan gains diversity from a fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary 
education system.”118  The court shared data in a footnote to support its as-
sertion that “the de facto segregation of schools in Texas enables the Top Ten 
Percent Plan to increase minorities in the mix, while ignoring contributions 
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to diversity beyond race.”119  The court viewed the Top Ten Percent Plan as 
“nearly indistinguishable from the University of Michigan’s Law School’s 
program in Grutter” and “was a necessary and enabling component of the 
Top Ten Percent Plan by allowing UT Austin to reach a pool of minority and 
non-minority students with records of personal achievement, higher average 
test scores or other unique skills.”120  Persuaded by UTA’s admission plan 
and its implementation, the Fifth Circuit stated “to deny UT Austin its limited 
use of race in its search for holistic diversity would hobble the richness of the 
educational experience in contradiction of the plain teachings of Bakke and 
Grutter.”121  In its final opinion sentence, the Fifth Circuit invoked two of the 
four seminal race-conscious cases, “to reject the UT Austin plan is to con-
found developing principles of neutral affirmative action, looking away from 
Bakke and Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without command—due only 
a courtesy salute in passing.”122  
In his twenty-six-page dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza argued UTA did 
not define “critical mass” and, therefore, “whether the University’s use of 
racial classifications in its admissions process is narrowly tailored to its stated 
goal . . . remains unknown.”123  Judge Garza accused the majority of “de-
fer[ing] impermissibly to the University’s claims,” and he asserted “this def-
erence is squarely at odds with the central lesson of Fisher.”124  Ultimately, 
he concluded that UTA had not satisfied the narrowly tailored prong and, 
therefore, would have reversed the court’s previous decision and ruled in fa-
vor of Fisher.125  The en banc request made by Fisher’s legal team was de-
nied, and now the Supreme Court will decide if the strict scrutiny two-prong 
test was properly applied on remand by the Fifth Circuit in Fisher I.126   
The Fifth Circuit entered its ruling on July 15, 2014, in favor of UTA, 
and Fisher filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.127  
On December 9, 2015, the Supreme Court heard another challenge against 
UTA.128 
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D. FISHER V. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (“FISHER II”) 
During oral arguments, the Justices, excluding Justice Clarence Thomas, 
posed several questions to attorneys on both sides.129  Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor interrupted Fisher’s attorney, Bert Rein, early into his argu-
ment.130  Justice Ginsburg inquired whether there would be a case if the Top 
Ten Percent Plan was eliminated and only the Grutter-like plan remained.131  
Justice Sotomayor joined the questioning, appearing not to be satisfied with 
Rein’s response, and asked how UTA had improperly used race in conflict 
with the Bakke standard.132  Justice Scalia inquired about critical mass studies 
and how UTA would know when it had reached a sufficient number of stu-
dents of color.133  Rein stated UTA utilized a good faith approach that passed 
muster with a majority in the Fifth Circuit but not with the Supreme Court.134  
Justice Kennedy, who has been labeled a swing voter in civil rights re-
lated cases, asked Fisher’s attorney to give an example of a concrete criteria 
that UTA would use to achieve diversity.135  He and Justice Alito seemed 
concerned that additional facts were needed, and without them, Justice Ken-
nedy said “we’re just arguing the same case.”136  Rein did not give a response 
that was sufficient to the question in that he argued the solicitor general would 
attempt to transform “abstract goals into concrete objectives.”137  It appeared 
questions about the process to achieve classroom diversity were not ad-
dressed to some Justices’ satisfaction.138  The Supreme Court stated in its 
Fisher opinion that unbridled deference would not be given to UTA’s deci-
sion making procedures.139  Justice Breyer reiterated this position during an 
exchange with UTA’s attorney, Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., in 
which Justice Breyer stated, “this Court will give some, but not complete, 
deference to what the University decides.”140  Chief Justice Roberts and So-
licitor General Verrilli, who argued in support of UTA’s program, had an 
exchange in which Chief Justice Roberts specifically asked “how does the 
 
129. Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher v. U. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2015) (No. 
14-981). 
130. Id. at 4-5. 
131. Id. at 4. 
132. Id. at 6-7.  
133. Id. at 12-13. 
134. Id. at 13.  
135. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 129, at 11. 
136. Id. at 20. 
137. Id. at 12. 
138. Id. at 20-22. 
139. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 642. 
140. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 129, at 75. 
           
2017] A COLORBLIND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 567 
University know when it has achieved its objective?”141  The solicitor general 
did not directly answer the question; instead, he focused on how the proposed 
approach by Fisher’s counsel of setting a demographic goal was not the so-
lution.142  Chief Justice Roberts along with Justices Scalia, Alito, and Ken-
nedy, posed questions that reflected a skepticism about whether UTA had 
met its burden of persuasion by providing enough evidence to support its ad-
ditional use of race in the admissions process.143  Chief Justice Roberts asked 
UTA’s attorney if the twenty-five-year end to affirmative action, suggested 
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Grutter, would be done in twelve 
years.144  Gregory G. Garre responded that systematic problems in K-12 ed-
ucation, specifically test score disparities along racial lines, made a definitive 
answer difficult.145  Based on the Justices’ questions, it seemed as though a 
majority might have remanded the case back to the district court for addi-
tional evidence gathering.  Alternatively, the majority might find the use of 
race unconstitutional because UTA did not meet both prongs of the strict 
scrutiny standard as to why race is an additional factor when considering the 
diversity of the student body.146  However, no remand occurred and on June 
23, 2016, by a four-to-three decision, the Supreme Court upheld UTA’s race-
conscious admissions plan.147  Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion 
that was supported by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.148  Justices 
Alito, Roberts, and Thomas dissented.149  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
Fisher had not met her burden of proof to show that UTA’s plan violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and UTA had provided a detailed account of its cur-
rent application review process and the nonracial measures taken that did not 
meet its diversity goals.150  
V. COLORBLIND DISCOURSE APPLIED 
In Bakke, Justice Powell gave a different interpretation of the colorblind 
argument that “prohibits the use of race as the sole factor in government de-
cisions absent a compelling justification.”151  Ironically, each Justice asserted 
that his colorblind position was based on an interpretation of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.152  A critical distinction in both Jus-
tices’ interpretations is that “Harlan believed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
has special relevance for Blacks, while Powell believed that Blacks and 
Whites must receive the same treatment.”153  Both interpretations lead to dif-
ferent outcomes and not necessarily either will result in justice for people of 
color regarding admission to race-conscious higher education institutions.  
Justice Powell’s version of colorblindness disconnects history and reality 
from the Court’s analysis.  It allows “white privilege”154 to be unnamed and 
avoids the questioning of white supremacy and social dominance.  Colorblind 
rhetoric distracts our society from dealing with the complex nature of “race” 
and “racism.”  It has stalled the discussions and actions of colleges and uni-
versities as they have adopted this detrimental Utopian viewpoint.   
Whiteness being normal aligns with the rhetoric of innocence, which is 
a concept discussed by legal scholar, Thomas Ross, as a legal tool used by 
White rhetoricians, lawyers, and judges.155  He asserts that the avoidance of 
Whites benefitting people of color’s oppression is a key component in the 
rhetoric of innocence, because it “obscures this question: What white person 
is ‘innocent’ if innocence is defined as the absence of advantage at the ex-
pense of others?”156  Bakke is an example in which “Justice Lewis Powell 
introduced the rhetoric of innocence to the Court’s affirmative action dis-
course,” appearing throughout the opinion and the oral argument.157  In the 
Bakke opinion, Justice Powell stated that “the patent unfairness of ‘innocent 
persons . . . asked to endure [deprivation as] the price of membership in the 
dominant majority . . . forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the burdens of 
redressing grievances not of their making.’”158  
Racial arrogance fuels conservatives to seek out ideal litigants for re-
verse discrimination lawsuits.  In Bakke, neither the university, Justices, nor 
Bakke “contested the legitimacy of medical school admissions standards that 
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reserved five seats in each class for children of wealthy donors to the univer-
sity or that penalized Bakke for being older than most of the other appli-
cants.”159  The Center for Individual Rights (“CRI”), a public interest group 
founded by Ward Connerly, a mixed race man of color, born and raised dur-
ing segregation who advocates for the eradication of affirmative action 
measures, including race-conscious admissions in higher education, inten-
tionally and strategically seeks out locations and people to challenge equity 
focused practices.  Connerly, being a person of color, gives credence to racial 
arrogance and serves as a poster child for post-racial society rhetoric.  Bar-
bara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz, and Abigail Fisher, all white women with inno-
cent and hardworking narratives, set the stage for arguing violation of their 
Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the context of 
higher education, Whites view themselves as having a right to obtain a de-
gree, and therefore, should be entitled to a “seat” in undergraduate, graduate, 
and professional schools.160  This sense of entitlement has been reinforced in 
higher education since its inception, and it has resulted in lawsuits filed 
against policies supporting the inclusion of people of color and not including 
legacies, athletes, or other Whites with lower scores.161  People of color are 
easy targets because of their marginalized “place” in society that has been 
politically, socially, and legally framed as unworthy of being admitted to a 
university over a White person.162  
In higher education and society, master narratives using “diversity” exist 
within the race-conscious admissions debate.163  Two ideologies of the con-
struct “diversity” have become institutionalized in the public’s rhetoric about 
equality efforts.164  One is that “diversity ideology represents white elites’ 
taming of what began as a radical fight for African-American equality” and 
the other is “the ideology of ‘diversity’ was a neoliberal response to the re-
actionary blowback against affirmative action.”165  Both ideologies of diver-
sity are flawed because neither has substantially moved society in a direction 
of inclusion and equality.  
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Derrick Bell voiced four key concerns with diversity and described it as 
a “distraction” to the achievement of racial justice.166  To support the four 
reasons, Bell gave specific examples for each one based on the Gratz and 
Grutter cases.167  First, “diversity enables courts and policymakers to avoid 
addressing directly the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many 
applicants.”168  Bell argued that his interest convergence thesis in which peo-
ple of color only receive benefits when Whites are not disenfranchised by the 
benefits, is manifested through the Justices’ and lawmakers’ lack of recogni-
tion for a history of discrimination that continues to impact people of color’s 
advancement, specifically in higher education.169  Bell stated the “Michigan 
lawyers and their civil rights allies shifted the focus from remediation for past 
discrimination to the value of diversity to the schools and to society.”170 
Second, “diversity invites further litigation by offering a distinction 
without a real difference between those uses of race approved in college ad-
missions programs, and those in other far more important affirmative action 
policies that the Court has rejected.”171  Litigation possibilities are increased 
by the Supreme Court’s fragmented opinions in both Gratz and Grutter.  Bell 
argued “the narrowness of this diversity ‘victory’ in the law school case and 
its vulnerability in future litigation can be gauged by the Grutter dissents.”172  
Heavy criticism from the disagreeing Justices of diversity meeting the strict 
scrutiny standard and the lack of definition for “critical mass” are evidence 
that the use of race in higher education admissions is not settled.173  Further 
proof of this turmoil is the Supreme Court’s acceptance of hearing Fisher a 
second time.  This decision signals to civil rights allies that the Supreme 
Court is not in agreement with the Fifth Circuit’s application of the strict 
scrutiny standard to use race as a factor in conjunction with Texas’s Top Ten 
Percent Plan.  There should be great concern that the decision will be made 
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through a colorblind constitutional analysis, which would eradicate the use 
of race in any form as an admissions consideration factor.  
Third, “diversity serves to give undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reli-
ance on grades and test scores that privilege well-to-do, mainly white appli-
cants.”174  Bell discussed meritocracy by using Justice Thomas’s opinion in 
Grutter v. Bollinger175 that concurs in part and dissents in part.176  Justice 
Thomas explained that he is anti-affirmative action because of “his convic-
tion that all such remedies are unconstitutional” and his personal belief that 
“blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling 
of university administrators.”177  Justice Thomas pointed out that alumni’s 
children being specially admitted is evidence of the lack of merit as a crite-
rion, yet this group does not draw needed attention and has not been included 
in litigation.178  Bell provided data that was collected to show how financial 
disparities disproportionately impact the ability of students of color to afford 
resources that can enhance their standardized test scores.179  “[T]he standard-
ized tests are retained for the convenience of the schools even though they 
privilege applicants from well-to-do families, alumni children, and those 
born into celebrity.”180  Limited resources to afford tutors for college prepa-
ration tests or access to the “best performing” schools is disproportionately 
weighted against students of color in comparison to the White peers.181 
Fourth, Bell points out that “[t]he tremendous attention directed at diver-
sity programs diverts concern and resources from the serious barriers of pov-
erty that exclude far more students entering college than are likely to gain 
admission under an affirmative action program.”182  To support this view, he 
gave examples about the economic hardships of people of color that have an 
impact on all areas of their lives, including quality education in the K-12 set-
ting.183  He concluded with a harsh criticism of diversity as not being an ef-
fective practice for the admission of students of color, but rather, “it is a 
shield behind which college administrators can retain policies of admission 
that are woefully poor measures of quality, but convenient vehicles for ad-
mitting the children of wealth and privilege.”184  
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Building on Bell’s assertion that diversity is a distraction, legal scholar, 
Kenneth Nunn, argued that “diversity fails as a social justice tool” and “pro-
vides no mechanism for addressing ongoing racial inequities.”185  Because 
the Supreme Court ruled quotas, set-asides, and “racial balancing” methods 
as unconstitutional, the process of colleges and universities intentionally as-
sessing their campuses for students, faculty, and administrators of color is a 
risky decision and any numerical measures implemented to address “low” 
numbers could result in lawsuits.186  
With the change of the Supreme Court’s majority viewpoint of race-con-
scious admissions programs between Bakke and Fisher, it has established a 
challenging set of “doctrinal barriers that must be overcome before a majori-
tarian affirmative action plan can be upheld.”187  Having determined that 
strict scrutiny is the analysis tool to determine if a governmental program 
meets a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve the stated 
interest in race-conscious higher education cases, the benefits of diversity and 
the Supreme Court’s analysis has evolved into a position that “equate[s] be-
nign discrimination with invidious discrimination, as if the harms that affirm-
ative action imposes on Whites are equivalent to the harms that Whites have 
imposed on racial minorities.”188  Additionally, at one time, the Supreme 
Court viewed racial affirmative action solutions as if there was inadequacy 
with proposed race-neutral measures.189  Based on the analysis of seven of 
the nine Justices and the lack of differences between Gratz and Grutter, the 
concern for a definitive standard is warranted.  Ironically, Justice Kennedy 
stated that strict scrutiny “must not be strict in theory but fatal in fact,”190 
which seems to be the same sentiment of two members of the conservative 
majority bloc.  In Grutter, Justices Scalia and Thomas stated that they did not 
find merit with “the educational benefits flowing from student body diver-
sity” meeting the compelling state interest analysis.191  At no time in history 
has the number of people of color been substantial enough to disrupt the ho-
mogenous environments of predominantly White institutions of higher edu-
cation.  These are still very “White spaces” and many are not welcoming to 
people of color, be it students, staff, faculty, or administrators.  
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VI. TODAY’S CONTESTS AGAINST RACE-CONSCIOUS 
ADMISSIONS 
The current status of race-conscious admissions is uncertain.  With the 
movement to ban affirmative action, the new legal challenges against Har-
vard University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and an 
upcoming anticipated conservative appointment to the Supreme Court, there 
is a full-fledged effort to eliminate race as one of the many factors in admis-
sions decisions and the ability of institutions of higher education to shape the 
diverse make-up of their student body.  The Supreme Court may either elim-
inate the use of race-conscious admissions, make it more challenging for in-
stitutions to utilize, or heighten the strict scrutiny standard impacting affirm-
ative action programs broadly.  The following section provides an analysis 
of current litigation.   
A. STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. V. HARVARD & STUDENTS 
FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA-
CHAPEL HILL    
On Monday, November 17, 2014, two separate lawsuits were filed 
against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
by a “newly-formed, nonprofit, membership organization whose members 
include highly qualified students recently denied admissions to both schools, 
highly qualified students who plan to apply to both schools, and their par-
ents.”192  The 120-page complaint against Harvard accused the University of 
“employing racially and ethnically discriminatory policies and procedures in 
administering the undergraduate admissions program at Harvard College in 
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”193  The plaintiffs also 
claimed that Harvard’s current program has resulted in a limited number of 
qualified Asian-Americans admitted yearly to the University.194  Project on 
Fair Representation’s (“POFR”) executive director, Edward Blum, helped to 
fund this lawsuit as well as Fisher v. University of Texas.195  Ironically, the 
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suit comes six months after POFR launched a website soliciting "students 
who claim they were not admitted to Harvard because of their race to partic-
ipate in a potential lawsuit."196  Harvard's general counsel released a state-
ment that referenced Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, touting the Universi-
ty's admissions plan as being ‘legally sound’ and alleged the University has 
continued the same practice consistently over the years.197   
Within the group of plaintiffs, there is at least one Asian-American who 
is a first-generation college student, graduated top of his high school class, 
scored a 36 on the ACT, and was active in multiple extracurricular activities, 
that was denied admission to Harvard.198  This student will seek a transfer to 
Harvard if it no longer uses race or ethnicity in its admissions “preference.”199  
In the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill’s complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged the same violation of Title VI and that the University cannot fulfill 
the strict scrutiny standard upon constitutional review since in the Univer-
sity’s amicus brief submitted in Fisher I the University stated it could “. . . 
maintain, and actually increase, racial diversity through race-neutral means 
if it ends its race-based affirmative action policies.”200  To date, no rulings 
have been made on either case to impact the future of affirmative action.201  
However, institutions of higher education and other stakeholders should con-
tinue to monitor these cases. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND BEST-PRACTICES FOR RECRUITING 
AND RETAINING DIVERSITY 
The discourse in the Fisher II oral argument was limited to the attention 
being brought to structural racism within the Texas K-12 school system.202  
UTA attorney Garre argued that without the use of race as an additional fac-
tor, the Top Ten Percent Plan did not yield a sufficient number of Blacks or 
Hispanics for classroom diversity.203  Colorblindness was evident in Chief 
Justice Roberts’ assertion that the Supreme Court has given the University 
“the extraordinary power to consider race in making important decisions . . . 
and so it was important in Grutter to say, look, this can’t go on forever, 25 
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years. And when do you think your program will be done?”204  Here Chief 
Justice Roberts appears to have dismissed the University’s assertion that race 
still matters, instead focusing on a deadline for ending measures that have 
been implemented to address centuries of subjugation, which minimizes the 
reality of racism not only in our society, but also in higher education prac-
tices. 
Institutions of higher education should take note of the Supreme Court’s 
Fisher II ruling in which review of admissions policies and criteria are ex-
pected to happen periodically.205  If there is a holistic review utilized, the 
factors considered should be transparent to potential students via websites, 
printed materials, and during on-campus recruiting events.206  Specifically, 
individual applicant review should consist of evaluating contributions in the 
form of various backgrounds and characteristics that align with an institu-
tion’s goals for inclusion.207  Additionally in 2011, the Department of Justice, 
in conjunction with the Department of Education, released a report, Guidance 
on the Voluntary use of Race to Achieve Diversity in Postsecondary Educa-
tion, summarizing the Supreme Court’s Grutter/Gratz decisions and provid-
ing examples for admissions practices that would be legal.208  One of the 
recommendations included a top percentile program similar to the one chal-
lenged in Fisher I, as well as using non-race factors such as socioeconomic 
and/or first generation status to potentially draw students from different racial 
and ethnic backgrounds.209  Programs like the Top Ten Percent Plan are con-
stitutional based on the Fisher II decision.  However, institutions of higher 
education that target students using race-neutral factors should maintain data 
on the ways in which their use of race continues to align with the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the Texas plan, otherwise the potential for lawsuits alleg-
ing reverse discrimination may be imminent. 
 
204. Id. at 50. 
205. David H. K. Nguyen & LaWanda Ward, Mutiny Over Strict Scrutiny? Interpreting the 
Judicial Approach to Race-Conscious Higher Education Admissions Policies, 331 ED. LAW REP. 1, 
17 (2016). 
206. Id.  
207. EDUCATION COUNSEL, LLC AND COLLEGE BOARD, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF 
APPEAL’S SECOND RULING IN FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS: THE DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS (2014), https://professionals.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/adc-summary-and-
analysis-of-5th-circuits-june-2014-decision-in-fisher-v.pdf. 
208. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE 
OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, https://www2.ed.gov/about/of-
fices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-pse-201111.html (last modified Oct. 28, 2015). 
209. Id. 
           
576 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:551 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
With the prevalence of a “post-racial society” ideology being dominant 
in our culture and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, scholars and other 
stakeholders inside and outside the academy should work towards “demon-
strat[ing] the harmful effects of racially isolated learning environments for 
minorities and society at-large.”210  Grassroots organizations that can politi-
cally influence local, state, and national lawmakers to defeat and repeal leg-
islation designed to re-segregate education at all levels is critical in light of 
the recent movement of using the ballot initiatives to further a colorblind 
agenda. 
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